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1 Introduction
The average size of US state governments, measured as the share of total state tax revenue
out of state-level income, increased from 3.05% in 1950 to 5.68% in 1997. By then, it varied
from 2.15% in New Hampshire to 8.14% in Minnesota. This paper finds that differences
in ideology, living standards, and crucially their interaction explain to an important extent
both the growth and variation in state government size. Pickering and Rockey (2011) propose
and find that differences in the growth of government observed in OECD countries since the
second world war can be explained by differences in ideology and in particular the interaction
of ideology with income. Ideology is defined as tastes for public services or indeed altruistic
redistribution relative to private consumption. When private consumption is a necessity
then at low levels of income the median voter, even when left-leaning, will not tolerate
reductions in private consumption induced by higher taxation and ideological differences
do not lead to differences in the size of government. However as income levels increase the
utility sacrifice from taxation in terms of lost private consumption falls faster than the utility
gain from increased provision of public services, and only then do ideological differences
manifest themselves in terms of government size. Using median voter ideology data derived
from manifestos Pickering and Rockey find that the interaction of government ideology with
income empirically explains much of the growth and divergence in government size observed
in the OECD sample.1
1An extensive literature argues that differences in political culture, expressed in the form of differing
political ideologies, play a role in determining the size and scope of government in mixed economies. Ace-
moglu (2005) makes this point in his critique of Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004). Using international
data Cameron (1978), Cusack (1997) and Tavits (2004) all find a relationship between government size and
ideology using fixed ideological data (i.e. defined by parties in power). Pickering and Rockey (2011) found
this relationship to be strongly conditional on income levels.
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This paper takes the same hypothesis to US state level data. There are three reasons
why the 48 continental states of the United States represent a better data set than analyzed
previously. Firstly and most importantly, as Besley and Case (2003) observe, the common
broad institutional and constitutional setting rules out many potential sources of unobserved
heterogeneity, a real concern in the international context. Secondly there are more than twice
as many states as there are countries in the OECD sample, hence the sample is larger. Third,
as detailed below the ideology data may be better measured.
Moreover the basic descriptive statistics seem to fit the story. The size of state government
has tended to increase, and as with the OECD sample it is also the case that this growth
has been far from uniform. Between 1950 and the end of the twentieth century government
grew by 5% in Minnesota, and actually shrank in Louisiana (by 0.19%) and Wyoming (by
0.24%). A general upward trend, together with an increasing dispersion thus characterizes
the US state level data as with the OECD sample.
Besley and Case (2003) examine the determinants of US state level policy and summarize
that “the early literature finds little evidence that party control matters” (ibid, p. 38).2 Party
control may be a weak determinant of government size for a number of different reasons: for
example in many southern states the Democrats historically have dominated politics, but
may not have been ideologically comparable with their colleagues in the north. Nonetheless,
it is interesting that “recent work finds support for party control” (ibid, p. 39), including
the regressions reported by Besley and Case themselves.3 The apparent late ignition of the
2In particular Winters (1976), Dye (1984), Garand (1988) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) all find
little evidence that the identity of the party in control (i.e. whether Democrat or Republican) determines
the overall level of spending.
3The relevant results in Besley and Case (2003, pp. 41, 43) are in their tables 8 and 9. Knight (2000)
also finds that Democrat (Republican) control of both houses leads to higher (lower) taxes rates relative to
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effect is consonant with the mechanism proposed by Pickering and Rockey given that income
levels have risen over time.
However as has already been observed party identity is an imperfect measure of ideology
due to heterogeneity in the stances taken by the same party in different states, or even by
the same party in the same state at different points in time (see also Erikson et al, 1989).
To address this issue Besley and Case (2003) employ ideology data provided by Berry et al
(1998) - which have been widely used in the analysis of state-level policies.4 These data are
compiled from the observed voting patterns of the state’s congressional delegation hence at
least are based on comparable actions taken by politicians. In contrast the Budge et al (2001)
data used in Pickering and Rockey (2011) are compiled from a textual analysis of manifestos.
The latter require stronger assumptions regarding comparability, not least in that the focus
is on words (furthermore written in many different languages) rather than deeds, and have
been criticized in the instances of Italy (Pelizzo, 2003) and Denmark (Hansen, 2008). These
data have also been found to exhibit weak convergent validity in the form of inconsistencies
relative to expert surveys (Benoit and Laver, 2007). In contrast Berry et al (1998, 2010)
report strong convergent validity of their measures with other indicators.
The empirical analysis employs the same set of controls, including institutional variables
as well as state (fixed) and time effects following Besley and Case (2003). Furthermore, given
the substantial persistence in government size the econometric specification is augmented to
state GDP, Besley and Case (1995) find that Democrats raise taxes and spending when working under term
limits and Rogers and Rogers (2000) also find that Democrat control in the house is associated with larger
government. Blais et al (1993) find that party identity plays a small role in driving government spending
using international data.
4As Berry et al (2010) note, Soss et al (2001), Shipan and Volden (2006), Wood and Theobald (2003),
Langer and Brace (2005), Songer and Ginn (2002), Kim and Gerber (2005) have all used these data as
determinants of state-level policy.
4
include the lagged dependent variable. The results show that the impact of ideology on the
size of the US state government is strongly conditioned by state income levels. At 1960s
levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible, whilst at 1997 levels of income we
find that a one standard-deviation move towards the liberal end of the ideology spectrum
results in an increase of state government size of about 0.6% of state income. The standard
deviation of state government size is about 1.2% hence ideology explains a sizable portion of
the observed differences at 1997 levels of income. The results therefore support the previous
evidence from the OECD sample.
To head off any potential concerns that the causal relationship of interest is not as we
claim, we also estimate state-time specific income elasticities of state taxation and regress
these on state-time ideology and income per capita. The results are exactly in line with the
theory. Income elasticity is found to be increasing with (leftist) ideology and decreasing with
income.
The next section revisits the Pickering and Rockey (2011) hypothesis formally and section
3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Ideology and the Growth of Government
In the seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard (1981) voters derive utility from consumption
and the median voter mandates redistribution because the income distribution is right-
skewed. The tax rate is set below 100% because the median voter rationally anticipates
the disincentive effect of higher taxes and the key insight is that greater inequality in the
before-tax income distribution leads to a larger government. Pickering and Rockey (2011)
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extend this analysis by arguing that public services are distinct in how they affect the utility
of voters and represent the government as providing a public-sector good in addition to pure
redistribution.5 Ideology is defined by preferences for the public good relative to private
consumption. One possibile justification is that services like education, health, defence and
law and order may be underprovided by private markets, and should enter the utility function
distinctly precisely because they are distinct. Another is that citizens derive altruistic utility
from redistribution (perhaps in kind).6 Stronger (conversely, weaker) tastes for these services
describe ideology that is left- (right-) wing. Notably these services may be ‘luxury goods’ and
exhibit income elasticity greater than one as in Wagner’s (1893) law. Ultimately whether tax
revenues are modeled to finance pure redistribution and/or a distinct public good depends
on the objectives of the researcher, and indeed Pickering and Rockey (2011) model the
government as providing both. In this paper for simplicity taxes finance public goods alone.
Formally in any particular state the voter (i) has a utility function
ui (ci, g) = F (ci) + βG (g)
where ci is consumption, g is the public good and F and G adhere to the standard assump-
tions that F ′ > 0, G′ > 0, F ′′ < 0 and G′′ < 0. We also assume that F ′ (0) = ∞, but
that G′ (0) ≤ ∞, i.e. the marginal utility of private consumption is very high at low levels
of consumption, whilst the marginal utility of the public good may be bounded even at
zero consumption levels. β defines the prevailing ideology in the state - with greater values
5It is simplest to think of the public good as rival and excludable rather than a public good of the
Samuelson variety.
6See also Alesina et al (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Benabou (2008) and Picketty (1995).
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denoting increasingly left-wing polities. Consumption is financed by disposable income, i.e.
ci = (1− t) yi
where t is a uniformly applied tax rate and yi is income of individual i. The budget is
balanced, with
ty = g
where y is mean income, hence g is shared out equally across the population.
Given the balanced budget, and that all individuals in the population are modeled to
have the same preferences the median voter is decisive and thus chooses t∗ such that
βyG′ (g) = ymF ′ (cm)
where ym is median income.
7 Assuming that the distribution of income is constant and
defining m = y
ym
(> 1) this can be rewritten as
βmG′ (g) = F ′ (cm) . (1)
This first order condition determines the tax rate which defines the size of government. Note
first that
dt∗
dβ
=
−mG′ (g)[
βmG′′ (g) + 1
m
F ′′ (cm)
]
y
> 0. (2)
In the general formulation a shift to the left (increase in β) increases the size of the govern-
7Note that given the properties of F and G the equilibrium is unique and bounded, i.e. 0 ≤ t∗ < 1.
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ment holding all else constant.
Equation (2) also makes clear that the impact of ideology on the size of government
in general depends non-linearly on mean income.8 However unless further restrictions are
placed on F and G it is not possible to say whether this impact increases or decreases as
income levels rise. Pickering and Rockey (2011) argue that consumption is a necessity. This
is the dual of Wagner’s law: if the services which the government provides are a luxury
good, in that the income elasticity of demand is greater than unity, then in a two good
world private consumption must be a necessity. A simple way to make this operational is
the Stone-Geary utility function
ui (ci, g) = ln (ci − µ) + β ln (g + µ)
where µ is the minimum level of consumption required for survival.9 This utility function
results in
t∗ =
β
1 + β
− (1 + βm)µ
(1 + β) y
, (3)
with the size of government converging on some ideal level β
1+β
as income levels increase (it
is assumed that y is sufficiently larger than essential consumption µ to guarantee t > 0).
Given this utility function then it follows that
∂t∗
∂β
=
y − (m− 1)µ
(1 + β)2 y
> 0.
8As well as entering (2) directly, cm and g also depend on y, hence restrictions on the third-order deriva-
tives are required.
9Meltzer and Richard (1983) also employ this functional form.
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This simply restates the above finding that an increase in β increases the size of government.
(The inequality requires that mean income sufficiently exceeds the level of subsistence - a
condition clearly met in the post-war era US.) Equation (3) also implies Wagner’s law, that
the relative state size will increase with mean income:
∂t∗
∂y
=
(1 + βm)µ
(1 + β) y2
> 0. (4)
The Stone-Geary functional form also implies two additional results, firstly
∂2t∗
∂y2
= −2(1 + βm)µ
(1 + β)y3
< 0, (5)
which means that the response of government size to income is diminishing as incomes rise.
As income grows to infinity, as is clearly visible from (3), government size converges to the
‘steady state’ defined by β
1+β
. As discussed in Pickering and Rockey (2011), once income
levels reach the point at which the government ‘takes off’ public sector growth is at first
quite rapid before slowing as the steady state is approached. Below we investigate how the
income elasticity of the demand for government varies with the income level empirically.
Secondly,
∂2t∗
∂β∂y
=
(m− 1)µ
(1 + β)2 y2
> 0 (6)
which implies that Wagner’s law depends on ideology. This is the main result in Pickering
and Rockey (2011). The impact of ideology on the size of government increases as income
levels rise. At low levels of income ideological differences may not manifest themselves
in differences in government size whilst economic growth will bring about a divergence in
9
government size across different ideologies. Pickering and Rockey (2011) find empirically
that government size in the OECD countries conforms to this story. In the below empirical
analysis we ask whether or not the same holds for the case of US state governments.
3 Empirical Analysis
The data source for the dependent and control variables is Besley and Case (2003), who
provide comprehensive state-level policy and institutional data for the years 1950-1997. The
size of the public sector is defined as total taxes per capita divided by state income per
capita.10 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for this variable in selected years. As dis-
cussed in the introduction the data exhibit an upward trend on average and also increasing
dispersion over time. The trend has not been constant, with most of the increases occurring
in the first half of the sample. These stylized facts are consistent with the theory outlined
above.
The apparent slowdown in public sector expansion in the later years could also be ex-
plained by a general ideological movement to the right, i.e. greater antipathy towards public
sector provision in the electorate at large. In support of this narrative Smith (1990) ana-
lyzes 455 surveys on the liberal/conservative dimension and writes that “Liberal growth was
strongest during the 1960s and early 1970s. In the mid-1970s, many liberal trends slowed,
with some stopping their advance and a few reversing direction”. The US-level ideological
data for presidential elections generated from manifesto data by Kim and Fording (1998,
2003) also depict a rightward shift by both major parties in the 1980s.
10Total taxes are defined as the sum of sales, income and corporate taxes. The data are described in full
in Besley and Case (2003).
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State level ideology data are taken from Berry et al (2010) (hereafter BFRHK), who
revise and extend their original data (Berry et al, 1998) employed by Besley and Case
(2003). BFRHK provide a measure of the median state-citizen ideology (ideoc) and two
series for state government ideology. The first of these measures uses Americans for Demo-
cratic Action (ADA) and Committee On Political Education (COPE) scores of congressional
representatives and is denoted ideogADA/COPE. The second uses NOMINATE measures of
state government ideology (ideogNOM) which rely on Common - Space scores of members
of congress. BFRHK find that the ideogNOM measure marginally outperforms their original
ideogADA/COPE measure in terms of validity checks, although both measures are utilized here
for the sake of robustness.
As noted in the introduction the BFRHK data perform well in tests of convergent valid-
ity. Nonetheless these data may still be imperfect measures of true ideology. In particular
the data are constructed from measures of the positions taken by congressional representa-
tives rather than state-level politicians. For example one key assumption (acknowledged by
Berry et al., 1998) made in the construction of the state-level government ideology series is
that state-level representatives of any particular party have the same ideology as members
of congress from the same party and state. Berry et al (1998) report strong correlations
between their data and the limited available data that does directly measure state-level
representatives’ ideology.
In the theoretical model the median voter defines policy, and Pickering and Rockey (2011)
employ median voter data in their analysis. Therefore, the median state-citizen ideology
measures are preferred. However, median voter models by construction abstract away from
the possibility that government policy may diverge from the median. For this reason and also
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the possibility of mismeasurement in the data the analysis also includes the state government
ideology measures.
Summary statistics of ideoc are presented in table 2. Higher numbers represent greater
‘liberalism’ (i.e. increasingly left-wing ideology.) The state mean exhibits a move towards the
right in the 1970s and 1980s relative to the 1960s. There is also clearly considerable cross-
sectional variation throughout the sample. Furthermore the summary statistics disguise
interesting state specific trends. The states of New England and California have tended to
be relatively leftist throughout, whilst Southern states such as Louisiana and Oklahoma have
on the whole consistently maintained a right-wing stance (though even in these examples
there is some temporal variation). On the other hand many Mountain states such as Idaho,
Wyoming and Montana have to varying degrees drifted rightwards ideologically, whereas
Southern Atlantic states such as Delaware, North and South Carolina and Virginia have
drifted to the left over time. Berry et al (1998 and 2010) describe these data in more detail
and argue strongly for temporal variation within states (hence criticizing fixed ideology
measures) and also identify considerable heterogeneity across states in both levels and trends.
Table 3 shows that the ideology data are quite strongly correlated with one another,
though not perfectly - there is at least some distinction between the ideology measures of the
median voter and government positions. This table also reports correlation coefficients of the
ideology data with political representation data, in particular the fraction of democrats in the
lower and upper houses (respectively FDLH and FDUH) which are in general much lower.
This provides further support for the argument that party representation in government is
a weak measure of the prevailing ideology in a state at a point in time.
The starting point for the econometric analysis is a replication of column 1 of table 9
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in Besley and Case (2003).11 This regression has total taxes per capita as the dependent
variable rather than taxes as a proportion of income, and in the interests of ensuring com-
parability we begin by following suit. Following their analysis this benchmark specification
includes both fixed and time effects and controls for the proportion of population aged 65
and above, the proportion of population aged 5 to 17, state income per capita in real terms,
and state population.12 There are also a number of other political variables included in
this regression namely FDLH, FDUH, an indicator variable for whether or not the gov-
ernor is a Democrat (DemGov), an indicator variable for Democrat control of both houses
(DemBoth) and also a measure of party competition (PolComp). Column (1) of table 4
reports the results which are very close to the original. The only slight exceptions are that
the estimated coefficient pertaining to ideology, whilst still exhibiting a positive sign, is no
longer statistically significant. It is likely that revisions to the ideology data made by Berry
et al (2010) underpin this discrepancy. In column (2) of table 4 the same regression model is
estimated with two modifications, firstly the extended ideology data are included, and sec-
ondly the standard errors are estimated robustly, and are clustered by state. Unfortunately
under this specification none of the political variables are statistically significant.
However, the hypothesis under investigation concerns the size of government relative to
GDP, i.e. total taxes divided by GDP. This is the dependent variable employed in Pickering
and Rockey (2011) hence column (3) of table 4 recasts the analysis using this alternative
11Note that because Berry et al (2010) have since updated their ideology data estimation is now feasible
for the full sample whereas Besley and Case (2003) only had access to ideology data ending in 1993.
12Besley and Case (2003) also used square terms in income and state population but we have dropped
these terms for two reasons. Firstly they are highly collinear with the other variables. In particular the
Variance Inflation Term (VIF) for state income is 180 when column (1) of table 4 is extended to include the
square terms. Secondly the theory is concerned with income elasticity and inference is more straightforward
when just the linear term is included.
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dependent variable. This time the relationship between ideology and state size is found to
be negative, though again insignificant.
One potential source of bias in the Besley and Case (2003) specification could be fiscal
transfers between the states via the Federal Government. It follows from the model of Section
2 that for any given level of income, positive net inter-state transfers and thus higher state
government spending would imply that the median voter’s preferred tax level will be lower.13
It is possible that these funds are not entirely fungible with those raised through taxation, and
therefore the total net value of transfers received, Transfers is added to BC’s specification14
in column (4) of table 4 but there is still little evidence for any political determinants of the
size of government.
The evidence therefore does not support a relationship between government size and
contemporaneous ideology. In fact this resonates with Pickering and Rockey (2011) who also
found little evidence of a contemporaneous relationship in the OECD sample. Following their
reasoning an alternative line of attack is to posit a link between lagged ideology measures
and current policy. In practice bureaucratic inertia might mean that it takes time before
the full impact of ideological shifts manifest themselves into policy changes. At any point in
time government size is likely to be cumulatively a function of ideology in several past years
rather than exactly mirroring the current zeitgeist. Following Pickering and Rockey (2011)
we define ideoi (where i = c, gADA/COPE, gNOM) as the moving average of ideology
over the previous 10 years. Taking the average of the past 10 years’ data also alleviates
concerns of endogeneity - the ideology measures now substantially predate the observations
13This follows immediately from the state budget constraint.
14The results below are robust to the omission of Transfers.
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on government size.
In table 5 estimation results are presented using the lagged ideology data. In the first
column the average of the previous 10 years of citizen ideology (ideoc) is used and the es-
timated relationship is now positive, though not statistically significant. Regressions using
lagged government ideology data (in columns 2 and 3) similarly reveal positive but insignif-
icant effects. More generally these results show no direct effect of politics on state taxation
- none of the political variables are significant. However the central insight of Pickering and
Rockey (2011) is that the impact of ideology on state size is conditional on income. Table
6 thus includes interaction effects. In column (1) ideology is measured using ideoc and the
estimated interaction effect (income× ideoc) is positive and significant at the 1% level. The
impact of greater liberalism on state government size increases with income as predicted
by the theory. The results for the measures of government ideology are are similar using
ideogADA/COPE though significance levels are lower in the case of ideogNOM .
However, before developing the inference of these results the econometric specification is
augmented to included the lagged dependent variable (LDV). There are (at least) two good
reasons for including the LDV. Firstly total government size is a slow moving variable, and
omission of dynamics will lead to autocorrelated residuals and biased estimates of standard
errors. Secondly the LDV helps to control for unobserved heterogeneity in that it contains in-
formation on any unobserved drivers of government size that are present in adjacent periods.
This is also now equivalent to the specification of Pickering and Rockey (2011).15
Table 7 contains the estimation results, confirming firstly that government size is highly
15The time dimension is sufficiently long that the bias engendered by the presence of the LDV is negligible
(Nickell, 1981).
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persistent. Columns 1a, 2a and 3a contain the estimated short-run (period t) impact of the
explanatory variables and columns 1b, 2b and 3b present the corresponding long-run param-
eter estimates. In all three cases, and again mirroring the results found by Pickering and
Rockey (2011) when examining the OECD sample, the ‘direct’ (or unconditional) impact
of ideology is estimated to be negative, but the overall impact of ideology is positive once
income levels are above a certain level. Column 1 contains the results using the (preferred)
citizen ideology measure. Using these parameter estimates it is possible to run an analogous
experiment to Pickering and Rockey (2011), who contrast government growth in archetypal
left- and right-wing regimes, respectively defined by ideology one standard deviation higher
and lower than the mean. Using the parameter estimates of column (1) then given represen-
tative state income growth from $6722 in 1960 to $14800 in 1997 state-government growth
is projected to be 1.25% in the archetypal right-wing state as compared with 2.46% in the
archetypal left-wing state. The difference of 1.21% may not seem large, but this represents
around one standard deviation of the variation in state government size in 1997. The inter-
action of state-income and ideology thus explains a sizable fraction of observed differences
in state government size.
The overall effect of ideology depends on the interaction term with income. Following
Braumoeller (2004), Figure 1 depicts how the overall effect of ideoc changes with income.
As predicted by the model, and similar to the findings of Pickering and Rockey (2011), the
graph demonstrates that ideology has little empirical impact on government spending until
a minimum level of income - around $14, 000 - is attained.
As a further test of robustness we examined the impact of institutions. Besley and Case
(2003) investigate how inter-state differences in taxation levels are explained by differences
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in voter registration requirements, spending and taxation constraints, limits on corporate
political donations, and the veto power of governors. One institutional variable which we
found to be a particularly robust driver of state government size was the existence of a super
majority rule.16 Super majority rules are found by Knight (2000) as well as Besley and Case
(2003) to have a negative effect on state spending. Table 8 columns (1)-(11) contain results
augmenting the specification in table 7 column (1) with each of the institutional variables one
at a time.17 The key result doesn’t change. In every specification ideology and its interaction
with income remain significant. The results further suggest that divided government, split,
or its interaction with a gubernatorial line-item veto, vetosplit, leads to lower taxation.
This suggests that divided government, consistent with Magalha˜es and Ferrero (2010) and
Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) as well as Besley and Case (2003), is another important
source of variation. Column 12 includes supmaj, split, and veto simultaneously.18 The
inference regarding ideology and its interaction with income remains unaltered.
Pickering and Rockey (2011) also use a two-step procedure to empirically analyze the
relationship between government size, ideology, and income. This procedure focuses on the
specific theoretical predictions that the income elasticity will be increasing in the relative
leftism of voters, and decreasing in the level of income.19 The first stage obtains state-specific
16In particular we estimated column 2 of table 13, column 4 of table 14 and column 1 of table 15 in Besley
and Case (2003), with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, and using clustered robust standard
errors. In this more demanding econometric specification, only the super majority rule survived in terms of
statistical significance. These results are available on request.
17Ideally we would include all of institutional variables at once. The problem with this approach is that
many of these variables are correlated with each other. Besley and Case (2003) also take the approach of
examining particular institutions in isolation.
18It is not possible to adequately distinguish between the effects of split and vetosplit as they are highly
correlated.
19The first of these hypotheses restates equation (6) and the second equation (5).
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time-varying estimates of the income elasticity of state spending. Specifically, regressions of
the following form are estimated for rolling 20-year subsets of the data:
t = β0i + β1iyit +X
′β + εit
where X comprises the same controls as used above and y is state income per capita. Es-
timated income elasticities thus may vary across space and time. Parameter estimates for
β1ia (where the subscripts i and a, respectively, denote states and the midpoint of the time
window) are collected and in the second stage these ‘Wagner coefficients’ are then regressed
on the midpoint ideology measure and midpoint income:
β̂1ia = γ0 + γ1ideoia + γ2yia + ζia.
Using the preferred ideology series (ideoc) estimation of the second stage yielded
β1ia = 0.843
(0.140)
+ 0.135
(0.027)
ideoia − 0.059
(0.012)
yia (7)
(with robust standard errors reported in parentheses). As with the OECD sample, the
Wagner coefficients are positively and significantly associated with ideology, and negatively
and significantly associated with income, in accordance with the theoretical predictions,
respectively contained in equations (6) and (5) above. Wagner coefficients for archetypal
left- and right-wing regimes are reported in table 9. The first clear result is the decline
in the income elasticity of government. At 1960s income levels a $1000 increase in income
roughly is estimated to lead to a half-percent increase in the size of state government, whilst
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at 1997 levels income elasticity of demand for government has declined to close to zero. These
results clearly support the hypothesis implied by equation (5) above. At the higher levels of
income, the growth of government has essentially levelled off. The differences attributable to
ideology seem at first sight to be smaller - though to repeat, the coefficient on ideology in the
second-stage regression is highly significant, in support of equation (6) above. The important
point to recognize here is that the ideological differences accumulate so that small differences
in income elasticity translate, over decades, into meaningful differences in government size.
For example, suppose that both types of regime in 1960 have government size equal to 3.852%
of state income and state income per capita of $6, 724 (the averages in that year). Given
representative income growth up to the 1997 average state income, these numbers suggest
that state government rises to 6.15% of state income in the archetypal right-wing state, and
to 6.50% in the archetypal left-wing state. The difference is 0.35% of state income, which
represents about one third of a standard deviation of the observed differences.
4 Conclusions
The idea that ideology explains differences in government size is as old as the observation
that government size differs across countries. The idea that economic growth explains growth
in government size is as old as the observation that governments have tended to grow over
time. Pickering and Rockey (2011) combine these ideas and argue for an interaction be-
tween ideology and income, and find this to be a significant determinant of the growth and
divergence of government size in OECD countries. This paper takes the same hypothesis to
US state level data. For three reasons the US data are preferable as a test of the model.
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Firstly there are more data, and secondly the ideology data are better than in the original
paper. Third and perhaps most importantly there is much less unobserved heterogeneity in
institutions and culture across states.
Differences in ideology have played an important role in shaping the evolution of US state
government size. The results in table 7 suggest that tax levels in archetypal right-wing states
have grown at under half the rate of the left-wing equivalent. Moreover, this difference of
1.21% is equal to about 1 standard deviation of observed differences in state government size,
suggesting that ideological differences when interacted with income accounts for a sizable
portion of the total observed variation.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for t
y
, the ratio of total
taxes to state income per capita
mean sd min max
1950 3.047 0.987 0.960 5.344
1960 3.852 1.099 1.423 6.354
1970 5.172 1.107 2.492 7.602
1980 5.381 1.054 2.450 7.436
1990 5.695 1.126 1.957 7.716
Total 4.629 1.471 0.960 7.716
Data are in percentage terms.
Each year reported contains data for all 48 states.
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Table 2: Descripitive statistics for ideoc
(1)
mean sd min max
1960 0.504 0.198 0.062 0.857
1970 0.445 0.182 0.110 0.816
1980 0.424 0.160 0.153 0.772
1990 0.484 0.132 0.219 0.883
Total 0.464 0.171 0.062 0.883
Each year reported contains data for all 48 states.
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients of the ideology and po-
litical representation data
ideoc ideog,ADA/COPE ideog,NOM FDLH FDUH
ideoc 1
ideog,ADA/COPE 0.662 1
ideog,NOM 0.375 0.874 1
FDLH -0.208 0.203 0.430 1
FDUH -0.262 0.154 0.393 0.893 1
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Table 4: Replicating Besley and Case
(1) (2) (3) (4)
total taxes
per capita
total taxes
per capita t
y
t
y
FDLH 48.002∗∗ 64.444 0.370 0.744
(22.268) (56.328) (0.441) (0.445)
FDUH 41.662∗∗ 28.504 0.489 0.541
(19.643) (41.836) (0.315) (0.371)
demgov -0.497 -4.842 -0.000 -0.019
(3.210) (5.381) (0.044) (0.050)
demboth 5.451 8.079 0.055 0.030
(5.690) (10.417) (0.085) (0.072)
polcomp 89.554∗ 75.220 0.943 -1.233
(54.293) (127.774) (0.894) (1.030)
citi6008 18.256 4.885 -0.179 -0.670
(21.730) (54.266) (0.430) (0.493)
transhare 0.546
(0.677)
Years in sample 1960-1993 1960-1997 1960-1997 1960-1997
Number of Observations 1583 1724 1583 1583
Number of States 47 47 47 47
R2(within) 0.899 0.894 0.679 0.645
Standard errors (in parentheses) in column 1 are calculated under the assumption of homoskedasticity.
(Clustered) Robust standard errors in parentheses for columns 2-4. ty is the ratio of total taxes to state
income. DemGov is an indicator variable set equal to one when the Governor is a Democrat. Demboth is
an indicator variable set equal to one when the Democrats control both houses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 5: Using Lagged Ideology Measures
(1) (2) (3)
ideoc ideog,ADA/COPE ideog,NOM
ideoi 0.006 0.287 1.007
(0.881) (0.368) (0.858)
income -0.047 -0.047 -0.048
(0.098) (0.099) (0.100)
FDLH 0.672 0.626 0.598
(0.458) (0.467) (0.464)
FDUH 0.378 0.403 0.391
(0.369) (0.365) (0.363)
demgov -0.041 -0.063 -0.077
(0.050) (0.052) (0.052)
demboth 0.061 0.050 0.043
(0.070) (0.072) (0.071)
polcomp -1.623 -1.903∗ -1.854∗
(1.225) (1.000) (0.950)
transhare 0.290 0.281 0.261
(0.673) (0.701) (0.700)
Years in sample 1960-1997 1960-1997 1960-1997
Number of Observations 1724 1724 1724
Number of States 47 47 47
R2 (within) 0.615 0.616 0.618
(Clustered) Robust standard errors in parentheses
t
y ,the ratio of total taxes to state income, is the dependent variable.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
25
Table 6: Introducing the Interaction of Ideology Mea-
sures and Income
(1) (2) (3)
ideoc ideog,ADA/COPE ideog,NOM
ideoi -4.361
∗∗∗ -1.993∗∗ -1.702
(1.232) (0.843) (2.298)
income× ideoi 0.497∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.246
(0.118) (0.075) (0.182)
income -0.366∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.194
(0.085) (0.086) (0.124)
FDLH 0.057 0.329 0.491
(0.458) (0.470) (0.467)
FDUH 0.255 0.552 0.477
(0.352) (0.346) (0.354)
demgov -0.041 -0.073 -0.067
(0.046) (0.052) (0.054)
demboth 0.101 0.043 0.040
(0.069) (0.067) (0.069)
polcomp 0.079 -1.107 -1.669∗
(1.055) (0.979) (0.933)
Years in sample 1960-1997 1960-1997 1960-1997
Number of Observations 1724 1724 1724
Number of States 47 47 47
R2 within 0.649 0.636 0.624
(clustered) Robust standard errors in parentheses
t
y ,the ratio of total taxes to state income, is the dependent variable.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Including the Lag of the Dependent Variable
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
ideoc ideog,ADA/COPE ideog,NOM
( t
y
)it−1 0.767∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
ideoi -0.763
∗∗ -3.281∗∗ -0.439∗ -1.967∗ -0.475 -2.192
(0.356) (1.461) (0.242) (1.079) (0.585) (2.778)
income× ideoi 0.103∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.051 0.238
(0.037) (0.143) (0.024) (0.100) (0.047) (0.217)
income -0.102∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.306∗∗
(0.035) (0.110) (0.030) (0.102) (0.033) (0.123)
FDLH 0.043 0.115 0.146
(0.156) (0.157) (0.156)
FDUH 0.019 0.071 0.055
(0.115) (0.106) (0.109)
demgov -0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
demboth 0.078∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
polcomp 0.150 0.050 -0.058
(0.336) (0.313) (0.297)
Years in sample 1960-1997 1960-1997 1960-1997
Number of Observations 1724 1724 1724
Number of States 47 47 47
R2 (within) 0.854 0.853 0.852
(clustered) Robust standard errors in parentheses
t
y ,the ratio of total taxes to state income, is the dependent variable.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of Ideology on government spending conditional on state income
per capita
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Table 9: Estimated Wagner Coefficients for Archetypal
left- and right-wing regimes, 1960 and 1997 levels of in-
come.
1960 Mean Income 1990 mean income
Archetypal left 0.521 0.044
Archetypal right 0.494 0.017
The estimated coefficients are generated using equation (7) in the text.
The 1960 mean income was $6, 722 per capita, and the 1997 mean income
was $14, 800 per capita. The archetypal left-wing regime has an ideology
measure set equal to 0.35, and the archetypal right-wing regime has an
ideology measure set equal to 0.55.
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